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[Crim. No. 6962. In Bank. Nov. 22,1961.] 
In re ALBERT J. HARRIS on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Lewdness-Obscenity-Obscene Books.-In a prosecution for 
selling obscene books in violation of Pen. Code, § 311, subd. 3, 
it was a denial of due process for the trial court Dot to allow 
defendant to prove contemporary community standards. 
[2] ld. - Obscenity - Obscene Books. - The standard for judging 
obscenity in books adequate to withstand a charge of consti-
tutional infirmity is whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted. 
Hugh R. Manes, Brock & Fleishman and Stanley Fleishman 
for Petitioner. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Philip E. 
Grey, Assistant City Attorney, and Wm. E. Doran, Deputy 
City Attorney, for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Petitioner's salesman was arrested, without a warrant, for 
selling obscene books in violation of section 31], subdivision 3, 
of the Penal Code. 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Lewdness, Indecency and Obscenity, § 5, 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Lewdness, § 5.5. 
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Incident to the arrest, virtually all the "books, magazines, 
writings, publications and papers" in petitioner's bookstorc 
were seized. Petitioner was thereafter charged in two counts 
with selling two specific books in violation of section 311, 
subdivision 3, of the Penal Code. 
At his trial all the material which had been seized was 
introduced into evidence for the purpose of showing "intent 
or notice. " 
Petitioner offered evidence that the books sold were not, 
according to contemporary community standards, obscene. 
The evidence consisted of expert testimony, comparable writ-
ings and pictures adjudged in Los Angeles County to be not 
obscene, and comparable writings and publications purchased 
in the community. All the offered evidence was excluded by 
the trial court. Petitioner contended before the trial court, 
and contends here, that he was thus denied due process of law. 
[ 1 ] This is the sole question necessary for us to deter-
mine : Was it a denial of due process for the trial court not 
to allow defendant to prove contemporary community stand-
ards' 
Yes. [I] The standard for judging obscenity adequate 
to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity is whether 
to the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a 
whole, appeals to prurient interest. (Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 489 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498] ; Aday v. 
Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 789, 797 [5] [13 Cal.Rptr. 415, 
362 P.2d 47] ; cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 [80 
S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205] ; Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 
175 F.Supp. 488, 502; Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of 
Obscenity, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 5,. 98; Lockhart and McClure, 
Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 
Minn.L.Rev. 295, 348.) 
Under the foregoing rule, the trial court's ruling denied 
petitioner due process of law. 
In view of our conclusions, it is unnecessary to discuss other 
arguments made by counsel. 
Petitioner is ordered discharged from custody. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur, but deem it appropriate to con-
sider an additional ground 011 which petitioner attacks the 
judgment against him. 
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Incident to the arrest of his codefendant, a salesman in 
petitioner's bookstore, between 75 and 90 per cent of all the 
books, magazines, writings, publications, and papers in the 
bookstore were seized by the police. All of this material was 
introduced in evidence at petitioner's trial to prove "intent 
. or notice" with respect to the two books on which the charges 
of violating subdivision 3 of Penal Code section 311 were 
based. 
Petitioner contends that this evidence was seized in viola-
tion of the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States as made applicable to the states through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
under the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081], 
the trial court was constitutionally compelled to exclude this 
evidence at his trial. He concludes that since its use against 
him constituted a denial of due process, he may collaterally 
attack the judgment on habeas corpus. This question is 
squarely presented in this case, and if the constitutionality 
of the seizure may properly be considered on habeas corpus, 
it should be determined now for the guidance of the trial 
court in the event petitioner is retried. (See In re Newbern, 
53 Cal.2d 786, 792 [350 P.2d 116] ; I'll re Dal Porte. 198 Cal. 
216,220 [244 P. 355] ; cf., Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) 
When this court adopted the exclusionary rule we pointed 
out that "It bears emphasis that in the absence of a holding 
by the United States Supreme Court that the due process 
clause requires exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence, whatever rule we adopt, whether it excludes or admits 
the evidence, will be a judicially declared rule of evidence." 
(People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R. 
2d 513].) Moreover, as we then analyzed the relevant de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court, we concluded that 
Mr. Justice Black was correct in stating that "the federal 
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amend-
ment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Con-
gress might negate." (Concurring opinion in Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 [69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782] ; see 
People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 439-440.) In Mapp v. 
Ohio, supra, 81 S.Ct. 1684, however, the United States Su-
preme Court overruled the Wolf case and held "that all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by the same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court." (81 S.Ct. at p. 1691.) It also pointed out that 
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the federal exclusionary rule had been constitutionally com-
pelled since its inception in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 [34 8.Ct. 341,58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834]. (81 S.Ct. 
at pp. 1687-1688.) Thus, neither we, in reviewing state court 
convictions, nor the federal courts, in reviewing federal con-
victions, may refuse to entertain a collateral attack on a 
conviction secured by the use of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence on the ground that such use constitutes no more than 
the violation of a rule of evidence. (See In r6 Leyva, 136 Cal. 
App.2d 750 [289 P.2d 271].) On the other hand, the United 
States Supreme Court has not held that because such use 
in itself violates the Constitution, it may be reached on col-
lateral attack, and in the Mapp case it pointed out that" AB is 
always the case, however, state procedural requirements 
governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral 
constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be 
respected." (Fn. 9, 81 8.Ct. at p. 1693.) Thus, we must 
look further to determine whether petitioner may challenge 
the constitutionality of the use of the evidence seized from 
his bookstore on habeas corpus. 
In In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 [264 P.2d 513], we held that 
alleged denials of even constitutional rights in the admission 
of evidence could not be reached on habeas corpus when the 
issue had been presented to the trial court on con1licting 
evidence and no appeal had been taken or adequate excuse 
offered for failing to appeal. We stated: "We must consider 
whether, regardless of the lack of a satisfactory excuse for the 
failure to appeal, we may properly pass upon petitioner's 
claims relating to forced confession and unlawful search 
and seizure. Petitioner argues that a failure to appeal will 
not prevent a resort to habeas corpus when, as here, funda-
mental constitutional rights are involved. His contentions, 
however, depend entirely on his version of·what occurred, and, 
as we shall see, there was ample evidence from which the trial 
court could have found that there was no violation of his 
rights. It is, of course, an established rule that habeas corpus 
may not be used instead of an appeal to review determinations 
of fact made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial. 
[Citations.] Likewise, the writ is not available to correct 
errors or irregularities relating to ascertainment of the facts i 
when such errors could and should have been raised by appeal. 
[Citations.] The same principles should apply even though 
the alleged errors involving factual issues relate to an asserted 
denial of constitutional rights. [Citation.] It would obviously 
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be improper to permit a collateral attack because of claimed 
errors in the determination of the facts after expiration of 
. the time for appeal when evidence may have disappeared and 
witnesses may have become unavailable." ( 41 Oa1.2d at 
. pp.760-761.) 
In the present case, however, petitioner has exhausted his 
remedy by appeal (see People v. Harris, 192 Oal.App.2d 
Supp. 887 [13 Oal.Rptr. 642]), and he contends that the 
record establishes as a matter of law that the seizure of evi-
dence from his bookstore was unconstitutionaJ.1 Under these 
circumstances he asserts that the Dixon case itself indicates 
that habeas corpus is available, and he points out that under 
similar circumstances, habeas corpus would be available in a 
United States district court to challenge a state's use of an 
involuntary confession. (Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 
[81 8.0t. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760] ; Leyra v. Denrw, 347 U.S. 556 
[74 8.0t. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948].) 
If the violation of a petitioner's constitutional rights by the 
use of illegally seized evidence had any bearing on the issue 
of his guilt, there should be no doubt that habeas corpus would 
be available. Unlike the denial of the right to counsel, the 
knowing use of perjured testimony or suppression of evidence, 
the use of an involuntary confession, or as in this case, the 
denial of an opportunity to present a defense, the use of 
illegally seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting 
an innocent person. The purpose of the exclusionary rule 
is not to prevent the conviction of the innocent, but to deter 
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. (Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 [80 8.0t. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 
1669] ; Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 [74 S.Ot. 
lThis contention is correct. Whatever the limit.-ttions on the seizure of 
evidence incident to a lawful arrest may be in other contexts (see gen-
erally, .d.bel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-235 [80 S.Ct. 683, 4 
L.Ed.2d 668], and cases cited), neither an arrest nor a search warrant 
can vest an officer with discretion to interfere with the distribution of 
constitutionally protected publications to the extent that occurred here. 
(Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, etc., Mo., 367 U.S. 717 [81 
S_Ct. 1708, 1716-1717, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127].) Even if a seizure of repre-
sentative samples of petitioner's non obscene publications dealing with 
sex would have been reasonable to provide evidence of. the general char-
acter of his business, it was wholly unnecessary to seize 75 to 90 per cent 
of the contents of the store including many pUblications that did not 
deal with sex at all. Such a seizure suggests, at least, that its purpose 
was not to secure evidence of " intent or notice" with respect to the 
two specific publications alleged to be obscene, but to punish petitioner 
for his alleged crimes without a trial by putting him out of business. 
Neither that punishment nor the procedure followed is a permissible 
means of enforcing Penal Code section 311. 
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354, 98 L.Ed. 503] ; Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 81 S.Ot. 1684, 1688; 
People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Ca1.2d 434, 443, 445; People v. 
Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760 [290 P.2d 855].) That purpose 
is adequately served when a state provides an orderly pro-
cedure for raising the question of illegally obtained evidence 
at or before trial and on appeal. The risk that the deterrent 
effect of the rule will be compromised by an oceasional errone-
. ous decision refusing to apply it is far outweighed by the 
disruption of the orderly administration of justice that would 
ensue if the issue could be relitigated over and uver again on 
collateral attack. 
Even if we were to limit the area of collateral attack to 
cases in which the facts were not disputed or to require that 
the facts be determined from the record on appeal viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
repetitious attacks on final judgments would not be eliminated. 
The law of search and seizure has not been static. The United 
States Supreme Court has only recently relaxed the require-
ments of standing to challenge the use of illegally obtained 
evidence (Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-267 [80 
S.Ot. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697] ; c/., People v. Martin, supra, 45 
Cal.2d 755, 759-761) and abandoned the rule that evidence 
illegally seized by state officers is admissible in federal courts. 
(Elkins v. llnited States, supra, 364 U.S. 206.) If collateral 
attack was permissible, such changes would invite fresh attacks 
on final judgments affirmed on appeal under the preexisting 
rules or on judgments from which appeals were excusably 
not taken in view of the apparent state of the law. Moreover, 
if such changes reflected refinements and improvements in 
constitutional law that went to the correct determination of 
guilt itself, one would indeed be reluctant to deny their bene-
fits to persons claiming that they had been convicted of crimes 
they did not commit through the denial of rights now deter-
mined to be of constitutional magnitude. Such changes, how-
ever, like the exclusionary rule itself have no bearing on the 
issue of guilt, and it is therefore easily understandable why 
the lower federal courts have consistently adhered to the rule 
that the question of unconstitutionally seized evidence may 
not be raised on collateral attack. (United States v. Zavada, 
291 F.2d 189, 191; Jones v. Attorney General of the United 
States, 278 F.2d 699, 701; Alexander v. U11ited States, 290 
F.2d 252, 254; Plummer v. United States, 260 F.2d 729, 730; 
Wilkins v. United States, 103 App.D.C. 322 [258 F.2d 416] ; 
United States v. Scales, 249 F.2d 368, 370; Barber v. United 
) 
) 
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States, 197 F.2d 815; Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 668, 669· 
670; Fowler v. Gill, 156 F.2d 565, 566; Graham v. Squier, 
132 F.2d 681, 684-685; Price v. Johnston, 125 F.2d 806, 811; 
Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825, 826.) 
Enforcing constitutional rights for the purpose of regu-
lating law enforcement activities is different from enforcing 
them for the purpose of correctly determining a defendant's 
guilt or innocence, as we recognized in another context in 
determining when an informer's identity must be disclosed. 
Thus, when it appears "that the informer is a material wit· 
ness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks disclosure 
on cross-examination, the People must either disclose his 
identity or incur a dismissal." (People v. McShann, 50 Ca1.2d 
802, 808 [330 P.2d 33].) If, however, the informer is not a 
witness on the issue of guilt, but has only provided informa· 
tion to justify an arrest, his identity need not be disclosed 
if the police had sufficient additional evidence to justify the 
arrest (Priestly v. Superiot· Court, 50 Cal.2d 812, 816·817 
[330 P.2d 39]) or used the information provided by the 
informer to secure a valid warrant. (People v. Keener, 55 
Cal.2d 714, 722·723 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587].) As 
. we pointed out in the Priestly case the policy conflict when 
the informer is a witness on the issue of guilt is "between 
the encouragement of the free flow of information to law 
enforcement officials and the right of the defendant to make 
a full and fair defense on the issue of guilt." When, however, 
the communications of the informer are only relevant to the 
issue of reasonable cause to make an arrest and search, "the 
policy conflict is between the encouragement of the free flow 
of information to law enforcement officers and the policy to 
discourage lawless enforcement of the law." (50 Ca1.2d at 
p. 816.) In the present case the conflict L<; between the policy 
in favor of finality of judgments and the policy to discourage 
lawless enforcement of the law. Since the latter policy may 
be adequately protected at trial and on appeal, it need not 
be further promoted by destroying the finality of judgments. 
This resolution of the conflicting policies is not precluded 
by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding 
that a state conviction may be attacked on habeas corpus in 
the federal courts on the ground that an iuvoluntary con· 
fession was introduced in evidence, even though that issue 
had been fully litigated and determined adversely to the peti-
tioner in the state courts. (See Rogel's v. Richmond, supra, 
81 RCt. 735; Leyra v. Denno, supm, 347 U.S. 556.) It is true 
) 
) 
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that involuntary confessions are excluded under the due 
process clause. net because they are unreliable, but because 
they are "the product of constitutionally impermissible meth-
ods in their inducement." (Rogers v. RiclmW'nd. supra, at 
p: 740.) In People v. Cahan we noted the apparent incon-
sistency under the Woll case in permitting states to use il-
legally seized evidence but forbidding them from using 
involuntary confessions even if shown to be reliable. We also 
stated that "The difference in treatment of these two problems 
may arise from the fact that ordinarily coerced confessions 
are associated with physical coercion against the defendant's 
person. This element is usually not present in cases of un-
reasonable searches and seizures (but see Rockin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205,96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]) 
which may involve only minor intrusions of privacy or result 
from good-faith mistakes of judgment on the part of police 
officers. " (44 Cal.2d at p. 442, fn.) Any inconsistency has 
now been eliminated by the Mapp case insofar as direct attack 
by appeal on a judgment of conviction is concerned, and it 
may be doubtful whether the reasons we suggested for the 
former distinction would alone justify retaining it for col-
lateral attack. There is another reason, however, for dis-
tinguiShing between involuntary confessions and illegally 
seized evidence on collateral attack. Thus, even though in-
voluntary confessions are not constitutionally excluded be-
cause they are unreliable, the fact remains that often they are 
unreliable. If an unreliable involuntary confession has been 
used against a defendant in violation of his constitutional 
rights, habeas corpus Should lie, for the constitutional viola-
tion is directly· related to the determination of the issue of 
guilt. To draw a distinction between reliable and unreliable 
involuntary confessions on collateral attack, however, would 
compel the development of two tests for judging confessions, 
one to be applied on direct attack and the other to be applied 
on collateral attack. The avoidance of such complications 
justifies treating all involuntary confessions alike and per-
mitting their use to be challenged on both direct and collateral 
attack. Illegally seized evidence, on the contrary, is not made 
unreliable by the illegality of its seizure, and accordingly, to 
permit collateral attack because of its use would be justified 
only to deter unlawful police conduct. The right to challenge 
police conduct at the trial and on appeal is sufficient for 
that purpose. 
